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IMAGINED CONSUMERS: HOW JUDICIAL
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE AMERICAN
CONSUMER IMPACT TRADEMARK RIGHTS,
FOR BETTER AND FOR WORSE
I. INTRODUCTION

The scope of trademark protection in the United States has
significantly expanded since the passage of the original Lanham
Act. Many trademark experts believe that this trend should be
These experts think that modem
halted or even reversed.'
trademark law overprotects the owners of well-known marks, with
little or no real benefit to consumers. 2 Basically, they want to see
trademark law return to its roots: protecting the consumer from
confusion as to the source of the products and services they
purchase.'
One popular solution to this problem is the trademark use
requirement.4 However, recent cases and articles cast doubt upon
the viability of the trademark use doctrine.! This Article proposes
another solution, which could be easily implemented-really, it
would require just that judges shift their view of the contemporary
consumer. Rather than coddling consumers and reacting to their
misconceptions, courts should presume that consumers hold a
This
reasonable degree of intelligence and sophistication.
consumer
reasonable
the
of
construction
aspirational
proactive,
would create a heavier burden for plaintiffs in infringement cases,
and thereby help curb the expansion of trademark rights. Further,
this shift in attitude would more accurately reflect the reality of the

1. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1715 (1999).
2. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MIcH.
L. REV. 137, 143 (2010).
3. Id. at 139.
4. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding TrademarkLaw
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2007).
5. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons From the Trademark
Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1704-05 (2007); Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2009).
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modem consumer, who has much greater access to information
and is less reliant on the information-conveying purposes of
trademarks.
This Article begins by briefly tracing the expansion of
trademark rights over the years, arguing that this expansion
ultimately harms consumers. Next, this Article criticizes certain
judicial constructions of the consumer as inaccurate or, at best,
unhelpful. Finally, this Article describes what an aspirational
construction of the consumer would look like, how it would work
in practice, and the positive effect it would have on trademark law
and the marketplace.
II. THE COSTS OF TRADEMARK OVERPROTECTION

Since the passage of the Lanham Act, the primary purpose of
trademark law has been to protect consumers from confusion.6
This confusion can refer either to confusion as to the source of
goods or confusion as to sponsorship of goods.' The basic idea is
that consumers should be able to rely on the informationconveying function of a trademark. If a deodorant says OLD
SPICE on the label or uses the OLD SPICE logo, then consumers
should be confident that the deodorant is in fact manufactured or
vouched for by Old Spice, Inc.
Trademark protection strengthens the incentive for Old Spice,
Inc. to invest in the quality of its product.! If anyone could market
deodorant under the OLD SPICE mark, then anyone could benefit
from Old Spice, Inc.'s investment in its brand, and the incentive
would be diminished.' These days, it is common for companies to
produce a varied array of products. Likewise, trademark law
would now bar a competitor from marketing OLD SPICE soap,
shampoo, shaving cream, etc.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1695 ("We give
protection to trademarks for one basic reason: to enable the public to identify
easily a particular product from a particular source.").
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
8. Lemley, supranote 1, at 1694.
9. Id. at 1695 (arguing that this increased incentive is a secondary benefit to
trademark protection, whereas consumer protection is, and should remain, the
Lanham Act's primary purpose).
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A. The Road to Trademark Overprotection
Trademark protection has expanded on three primary fronts.
First, consumers have become more prone to confusion due to
aggressive marketing, licensing, and litigation by mark owners.
Second, changes to the Lanham Act have added protection against
trademark dilution. Third, courts have been willing to consider
new types of confusion, such as initial interest confusion, post-sale
confusion, and in a few instances, subliminal confusion.
How far trademark rights extend depends on whether consumers
are likely to be confused. Consequently, the scope of trademark
protection is contingent on the mental states of the consuming
public. As Professor Barton Beebe puts it, "trademarks are a
property purely of consumers' minds."o The strength of this
standard is that it is fluid and responsive to changes in society and
the marketplace. The weakness is that the standard tends to be
fluid in just one direction."
Professor James Gibson describes this avenue of trademark
rights expansion as the "trademark feedback loop." 2 Because the
scope of trademark protection is contingent on consumer
confusion, the argument goes, trademark rights exist where
consumers perceive them to exist. 3 However, consumers are not
trademark lawyers, and they often have misconceptions about the
current state of trademark law. For example, a consumer may
believe that Saturday Night Live needs permission to parody Old
Spice commercials when in fact SNL needs no such thing.14 This
consumer will be confused into thinking that Old Spice has
sponsored, endorsed, or condoned the sketch. The misperception

10. Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 2020, 2021 (2005).
11. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
PropertyLaw, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 908 (2007).
12. Id. at 907.
13. Beebe, supra note 10, at 2021.
14. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding infringement, based on survey evidence that many consumers
believed that a humor magazine required Anheuser-Busch's permission to
parody its advertisements).
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feeds back into trademark law through the consumer confusion
standard, completing the loop.
The most disturbing aspect of the feedback loop is that it gives
mark owners a measure of control over trademark law which
circumvents the normal legislative and judicial process. Through
aggressive litigation, mark owners can influence the public's
perception of what constitutes trademark infringement.
Additionally, the prospect of expensive litigation can persuade a
would-be defendant to concede to a trademark owner's demands
either by ceasing its current practices or by purchasing
unnecessary licenses." As excessive licensing becomes the norm
in the marketplace, this influences public perception and creates
new instances of confusion, which again completes the feedback
loop. 6
Professor Mark A. Lemley points out another source of
trademark rights accretion: the application of trademark principles
to cutting-edge fact patterns where traditional trademark rules are
ill-suited, as in keyword advertising cases and domain name
disputes." Once an entity manages to secure "new" trademark
rights through litigation, everyone else wants to jump on board and
secure this right too." Mark owners then attempt to apply this
newly minted trademark right to more traditional fact patterns
where such rights have yet to be applied. 9
Trademark rights have also expanded through additions to the
Lanham Act.20 Recent iterations of the Lanham Act have made

15. Gibson, supra note 11, at 913 (arguing that businesses tend to be risk
adverse and will err on the side of purchasing unnecessary licenses, if just to
avoid a lawsuit).
16. Id. at 923.
17. Lemley, supra note 1, at 1698, 1703 (Lemley calls this "doctrinal
creep"); see also Thomas C. Folsom, Missing the Mark in Cyberspace:
Misapplying Trademark Law to Invisible and Attenuated Uses, 33 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 137, 165-68 (2007) (arguing that the "doctrinal creep"
problem outlined by Lemley is especially prevalent in cases involving the
Internet and cutting edge technology).
18. Lemley, supra note 1, at 1698.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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"dilution" a cause of action.2' Dilution protects the owners of
famous marks from "blurring" and "tarnishment." Blurring occurs
when there exists an "association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark." 22 Tarnishment requires an
"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade
name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark." 23 Dilution, unlike a standard infringement claim, does not
require any likelihood of consumer confusion to be actionable.24
Further, in the trademark infringement context, judges have
recognized new variations of confusion, enabling trademark
owners to succeed in cases that would have been unwinnable fifty
years ago.25 Traditionally, courts linked confusion to lost sales,
e.g., the case where a consumer buys Acme deodorant when he
intended to buy Old Spice. Here, the harm is easy to assess: the
consumer loses because he bought the wrong kind of deodorant,
and Old Spice loses because (1) it lost a sale, and (2) if the
consumer continues to believe that the deodorant is Old Spice after
the point of sale, any negative reaction the consumer has to the
imposter deodorant will be unfairly attributed to Old Spice, Inc.
rather than Acme, Inc.
Today, many courts recognize initial interest confusion. 26 This
occurs when a consumer is drawn to Acme deodorant falsely
believing it is Old Spice, perhaps due to similar packaging or
brand name, but the consumer realizes his mistake before actually
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
22. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
23. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
24. Id. § 1125(c).
25. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999) ("Courts have been generous
in interpreting the scope of confusion from which today's credulous purchasers
must be protected: Not only must they be shielded from confusion about the
source of a product at the point of sale, they must also be protected from aftermarket confusion, reverse confusion, subliminal confusion, confusion about the
possibility of sponsorship or acquiescence, and even confusion about what
confusion the law makes actionable.").
26. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818
F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
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purchasing the Acme deodorant.27 Initial interest confusion differs
from traditional confusion because it exists even in cases where
the consumer does not purchase the unwanted product. 28 The harm
is more attenuated here: Old Spice did not lose a sale, and the
consumer ended up with the correct product.
Courts have
characterized the harm in terms of "search costs," i.e., the
consumer is injured because his time has been wasted.29 In just
one instance, the cost of the consumer's momentary confusion is
the insignificant loss of a few seconds; in the aggregate, the
argument goes, these search costs may add up to calculable
economic waste."
Some circuits also recognize post-sale confusion." As the name
implies, this confusion occurs after the point of sale, and refers to
the confusion of parties other than the actual purchaser.32 Let's say
that Acme places its deodorant, which looks remarkably similar to
Old Spice, in an additional layering of packaging that clearly
differentiates the Acme product from Old Spice. After a consumer
buys the Acme deodorant free of confusion, he would probably
toss the packaging in the trash. His roommate, who did not make
the purchase and thus never saw Acme's distinctive layer of outer
packaging, may mistake the Acme deodorant for actual Old Spice.
If the roommate secretly steals a few applications of the Acme
product, and the roommate botches a job interview because he
reeks of cheap deodorant, then the roommate would blame his bad
experience on Old Spice, Inc. Furthermore, if this particular kind
of Old Spice were very expensive and rare, the knockoff might

27. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 2, at 151.
28. Id.
29. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw:
An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON. 265, 275 (1987) (arguing that search
costs provide a rational economic basis for infringement actions based on initial
interest confusion).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986).
32. Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672 (8th Cir.
1996).
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harm consumers that bought the real deal by diminishing the
product's perceived scarcity.33
The Second Circuit and a few districts courts have recognized
Subliminal
subliminal confusion as an actionable claim.34
confusion occurs when a name, logo, or packaging reminds the
consumer of another mark at the subconscious level." The theory
of harm is that the consumer will confuse the reputations and
goodwill associated with the two brands.36 Also, the owner of the
more established mark suffers from some amount of freeriding by
the infringer.3 7 Notably, the consumer undergoes no actual
confusion as to which manufacturer makes each product.38
B. Winners andLosers of TrademarkExpansion
Who benefits from these new causes of action, new types of
confusion, and increased protection of marks? Dominant, wellestablished trademark owners benefit, certainly. On the surface, it
would seem that consumers benefit as well. With regard to initial
33. See Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2000) (arguing that "the purchaser of an original is harmed by the
widespread existence of knockoffs because the high value of originals, which
derives in part from their scarcity, is lessened.").
34. Chi-Ru Jou, The Perils of a Mental Association Standard of Liability:
The Case Against the Subliminal Confusion Cause of Action, 11 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 2, 2 (2006) (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 687
F.2d 563, 570 (2d Cir. 1982); Verifine Prods., Inc., v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F.
Supp. 240, 251 (D. Puerto Rico, 1992); Suncoast Tours, Inc. v. LambertGroup,
Inc., No. CIV.A.98-5627, 1999 WL 1034683, at *5 (D.N.J. 1999); Resorts Int'l,
Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826 (D.N.J. 1992);
Oxford Indus., Inc. v. JBJ Fabrics, Inc., No. 84 CIV.2505, 1988 WL 9959, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
35. Id. at 6 (providing an overview of the subliminal confusion theory of
harm).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 26 (stating that such freeriding "is possible because the
'commercial magnetism' of a 'congenial symbol' creates a favorable impression
in the minds of consumers").
38. Id. at 18 (arguing that subliminal confusion can exist without source
confusion, due to the fact that with the former the consumer is not consciously
aware that she is mistakenly attributing certain characteristics of one brand to
another).
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interest confusion, courts have shielded consumers from the
frustration of increased search costs. Post-sale confusion harms
would-be customers dissuaded from purchasing a product that they
would otherwise enjoy. As to dilution, consumers benefit from a
greater enjoyment of the intangibles associated with purchasing
famous brands.
So far, this all seems like great news for consumers. But there
are tradeoffs. There are three principal harms associated with
trademark overprotection: (1) increased monopolization and
decreased competition; (2) encouragement of poor shopping
habits, resulting in irrational decisions and economic waste; and
(3) limitations on speech.
1. Trademark Expansion and Monopolization
Once an entity secures the right to use a trademark, it could
potentially retain this right forever. This sets trademarks apart
from other forms of intellectual property: both patents and
copyrights are granted for a definite term. In exchange, trademark
law carries with it a different set of limitations. Trademarks
cannot be owned in gross; rather, they are only good insofar as
they attach to specific products and services. Trademarks must be
sufficiently distinctive in order to receive protection. If they are
merely descriptive, a mark owner must prove secondary meaning
to gain protection, and if the term is generic no protection can be
afforded.39 Likewise, if a mark is functional, it receives no
protection.4 0 These limitations aim to balance the goods of
trademark protection-e.g., investment in brands, confidence in
the source-identifying function of marks, and the joy of purchasing
products from famous brands-against the harm of
monopolization.
Trademark-based monopolies can manifest themselves in
different ways and to varying degrees. Most fundamentally, strong
brands make it more difficult for new entrants to compete in the
market, especially when a court is willing to recognize initial
39. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir.
1976).
40. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
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interest confusion.4 1 Professor Laura Bradford argues that,
because the established brand will be more familiar and may even
engender reflexive positive feelings, consumers will unconsciously
favor the established brand. 42 Thus, an easy and cheap strategy for
new entrants to employ is to "free ride" on the established
producer's marketing campaign.
Applying this concept of freeriding to our deodorant example,
the new entrant Acme might purposively use packaging or a logo
that calls to mind the OLD SPICE mark. As a result, consumers
would pay more attention to the Acme product than they would
otherwise. This is perhaps a beneficial instance of "initial interest
confusion."43 Also, the similarity in appearance communicates to
consumers that Acme is comparable to Old Spice, or is meant to
appeal to a similar class of people. Additionally, customers
benefit by inheriting secondhand some of the "atmospherics of the
imitated trademark."4 4 With Acme, the message goes, you too can
be an Old Spice man, but at a discounted price.
If a court finds Acme's use to be infringing because it causes
First,
initial interest confusion, this can harm consumers.
assuming that the product is more or less an Old Spice equivalent
sold at a lesser price, a consumer would benefit from paying extra
attention to the Acme product-if he takes the risk and tries it out,
he might switch. Professor Ross D. Petty goes so far as to say that
"courts that have adopted the initial interest confusion doctrine

41. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in TrademarkLaw, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223-24 (2007).
42. Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1283 (2008).

43. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 769
(2004) (arguing that momentary confusion may help new market entrants attract
customers with little to no harm to costumers loyal to the established brand, and
that such confusion is beneficial to the consumers who decide to switch to the
new entrant).
44. Jou, supra note 34, at 3 (arguing that increased competition is one
positive effect of subliminal trademark association).
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have contradicted . . . the fundamental concept of consumer

sovereignty that underlies a free market economy."45
2. Trademark OverprotectionandIrrationalConsumption
In addition to constraining the free market, the overprotection of
trademarks encourages irrational purchasing behavior on the part
of consumers.4 6 When marks are given very strong protection,
producers have a greater incentive to invest in their products. This
investment goes beyond simply finding ways to improve the
product or bettering quality control. Much of this investment
relates to branding itself, through advertising.
Advertising plays two roles. On one hand, advertisements
convey information concerning product features, cost, and
location, etc.47 On the other hand, advertisements aim to persuade
through emotion. 48
The information-conveying function of
advertising appeals to our rational side; the persuasive function
appeals to our less-than-rational side. Assuming that we'd like
consumers to make smart choices, the fact that it is often the
persuasive function of advertising that convinces people to buy
certain products is problematic. As Professor Chi-Ru Jou frames
the issue, "If consumers typically make irrational purchasing
decisions based upon advertising atmospherics rather than the
signaling function of the trademark as to the quality of the goods, a
real conundrum arises as to whether and how trademark law could
conceptualize its goal of giving consumers what they really
want."49
But what distinguishes a rational purchasing decision from an
irrational one? One way to characterize this distinction is as a
45. Ross D. Petty, Initial Interest Confusion Versus Consumer Sovereignty:
Consumer Protection Perspective on Trademark Infringement, 98
TRADEMARK REP. 757, 787 (2008).
46. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C.
L. REv. 427, 448 (2010) (pointing to survey evidence suggesting that most
buyers of the Toyota Prius were motivated more by the image associated with
the Prius than for the Prius' fuel economy).
47. Litman, supra note 25, at 1719.
48. Id.
49. Jou, supra note 34, at 27.

A
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matter of motivation. One might expect rational purchasing
decisions to be based on logical considerations, whereas an
irrational decision would be based on emotion. However, research
suggests that many purchasing decisions rely heavily on emotional
intuition, and that this process actually leads to efficient outcomes
in terms of customer satisfaction." On the other hand, research
also suggests that materialistic individuals often maintain strong
relationships with established brands because of a fear of deathsuch consumption is irrational in a true Freudian sense." Given
that a metric based on consumer motivations would be hopelessly
intertwined with muddy things like human psychology, an
alternate approach is desirable.
A better way to differentiate between rational and irrational
consumer behavior is to focus on outcomes. Rational decisions
would tend to lead to positive outcomes, whereas irrational
decisions would not. The issue then becomes how to distinguish
between positive and negative outcomes. There are two primary
considerations: (1) the objective economic utility of the purchase,
and (2) whether the consumer is subjectively satisfied (i.e. made
happy) by the purchase.
From an economic utility perspective, it is easy to see how
advertising can lead to wasteful outcomes. Producers attempt to
persuade consumers that purchasing their product will bring all
kinds of wonderful benefits, such as emotional fulfillment, better
looks, sex, friends, social status, and wealth. It goes without
saying that this is ridiculous, and today's consumer knows it;
nevertheless, today's consumer can't help but be persuaded
anyway.
Producers are especially fond of advertising irrelevant product
characteristics in an effort to differentiate the brand from those of
50. Leonard Lee, On Amir & Dan Ariely, In Search of Homo Economicus:
Cognitive Noise and the Role of Emotion in Preference Consistency, 36 J.
CONSUMER RES. 173-87 (2009) [hereinafter Leonard Lee et al., In Search of
Homo Economicus] (subjects were given a binary choice between two products
in conditions designed to invoke either emotional or cognitive decision making
processes, and then tested on preference consistency).
51. Aric Rindfleisch, James E. Burroughs & Nancy Wong, The Safety of
Objects: Materialism, Existential Insecurity, and Brand Connection, 36 J.
CONSUMER RES. 12 (2009).
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competitors.52 These techniques, based on imaginary benefits and
attributes, persuade consumers to pay more for the brand with the
expensive advertisement campaign." The brand owner then uses
its increased profit margins to fund ever more elaborate and costly
ad campaigns. Trademark overprotection fuels this process by
ensuring a strong mental connection between the advertisement
and the advertised product, free from interference by pesky
competitors.5 4 The end result is economic waste: less cash going
towards the production of goods, more cash going towards clever
advertising campaigns."
When a mark becomes valuable in and of itself-e.g., the OLD
SPICE logo licensed for use on a coffee mug-this leads to
Unless this author is missing
irrational consumption patterns.
something, there is nothing especially aesthetically pleasing about
the OLD SPICE logo, especially when placed on a coffee mug.
Yet, it is plausible that there would be a market for these mugsmaybe coffee-loving deodorant enthusiasts-and that interested
consumers would pay a premium for them. For brand owners, this
kind of licensing arrangement results in pure profit-they don't
even need to make the mugs! Furthermore, even if the mugs were
low quality and broke easily, there is little evidence showing that
customers would blame Old Spice, Inc." What consumers would
52. Gregory S. Carpenter, Rashi Glazer & Kent Nakamoto, Meaningful
Brands from Meaningless Differentiation: The Dependence on Irrelevant
Attributes, 31 J. MARKETING REs. 339 (1994).

53. Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 461(another survey cited by Gerhardt shows
that "loyalty to self-affirming brands is so strong that consumers will stick with
their chosen brands-even after experiencing alternatives that work better.").
54. Jou, supra note 34, at 28 ("Consumer susceptibility to persuasive
advertising was once famously emphasized by Ralph Brown as a reason to
strictly limit legal protection to the source-identifying function of trademarks,
i.e. to the prevention of confusion.").
55. Id. at 27 ("[C]onsumer susceptibility to advertising would seem to be an
equally compelling reason to minimize trademark protection so as to maximize
the market disciplinary effects of competition.").
56. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA
L. Rev. 621, 657-58 (2004) (discussing the phenomenon where a "trademark's
goodwill is commodified and sold as its own product").
57. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L.
REv. 413, 436-46 (2010) (providing an overview of market research on the
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be buying, apparently, is a reminder to themselves and the world at
large that they use Old Spice.
From the perspective of objective economic utility, paying extra
for the logo on a mug is ridiculous. But from a subjective,
customer satisfaction perspective, there is nothing inherently
terrible about purchasing an Old Spice coffee mug, besides the
suspicion that the Old Spice fan's money would be better spent
elsewhere than Old Spice's advertising campaigns.
If it makes the customer happy, then where is the harm? One
harm is that the consumer has less money. Although the customer
may believe the purchase was fair, he is still a few dollars poorer
than before. Most likely, he would have saved money by
purchasing a coffee mug unadorned by a corporate logo. Further,
the mug is unlikely to make the customer happy in the long term
because consumers adapt quickly to material goods. Once the
novelty wears off, the Old Spice mug melts into the background of
the purchaser's habitat, and it no longer increases the purchaser's
happiness."
As we can see, customer satisfaction is a tough concept to pin
down. Often, a consumer will make purchases that lead to an
immediate spike in happiness, but which he later regrets.
Consumers are very good at determining which familiar purchases
will increase their happiness in the short term.59 However, if this
happiness stems just from the atmospherics associated with a
brand and its advertising then the happiness is illusory,
economically wasteful, and will likely be fleeting. Trademark
overprotection exacerbates this problem by amplifying the efficacy
of advertising and strengthening the mental association between
the brand and product in the mind of the consumer.
topic of sponsorship and consumer perception of brand quality; ultimately, the
authors conclude that negative brand publicity stemming from the brand's mere
sponsorship of a bad product is negligible).
58. Leonardo Nicolao, Julie R. Irwin & Joseph K. Goodman, Happinessfor
Sale: Do Experiential Purchases Make Consumers Happier than Material
Purchases?, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 188-89 (2009) (arguing that experiential
purchases tend to have a greater and more lasting impact on a person's
happiness than material purchases).
59. See Joel Waldfogel, Does Consumer Irrationality Trump Consumer
Sovereignty?, 87 REv. ECON. & STAT. 695-96 (2005).
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3. Speech Issues
Increasingly, trademark law is brushing up against free speech
issues."o We live in a world dominated by brand names and logos.
Reference to these words and images can be important to selfexpression and identity.' As Professor John Tehranian points out,
"[t]rademark law can proscribe the use of a single word as a
designation of the source or origin of a product in a way that is
likely to cause consumer confusion or dilution (through either
blurring or tarnishment)."62 The prevalence of product placement
in the entertainment industry will likely create a greater potential
for confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement across a variety of
artistic mediums.63 Even with the availability of fair use defenses,
the prospect of costly and unpredictable litigation can have a
chilling effect on speech." As Professor Lemley puts it, "our
ability to discuss, portray, comment, criticize, and make fun of
companies and their products is diminishing.""
III. MORONS IN A HURRY

This Article argues that one solution to the problem of
trademark overprotection is for the law to take a proactive stance
when it comes to judging the sophistication and intelligence of
consumers. This will allow courts to hold trademark plaintiffs to a
stricter standard without having to adopt controversial doctrines
like the trademark use requirement. Additionally, this aspirational
construction of the consumer will more accurately reflect the
modem consumer. Today's consumers have much greater access
60. See John Tehranian, Parchment,Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and
the IP (IdentityPolitics) oflP (IntellectualProperty), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 45
(2011).
61. Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 459-60.
62. Tehranian, supra note 60, at 45.
63. For example, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769,
775 (8th Cir. 1994), survey evidence showed that the public believed that a
satirical magazine required the beer manufacturer's permission in order to
parody a Michelob advertisement.
64. Lemley, supra note 1, at 1712.
65. Id. at 1711.
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to information, and are thus less reliant on the informationconveying purposes of trademarks. Before detailing this approach,
it is necessary to summarize where conceptions of the consumer fit
into the trademark infringement analysis.
In a standard action for trademark infringement, the plaintiff
trademark owner must prove likelihood of confusion." This can
exist where an "appreciable number of ordinarily prudent
purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to
the source of the goods in question or when consumers are likely
to believe that the challenged use of a trademark is somehow
sponsored, endorsed, or authorized by its owner."6 7 Different
circuits look to a (slightly) different set of factors in making this
determination. Many, but not all, circuits explicitly include the
sophistication of the product's customer base among these
factors;" however, assumptions about the intelligence and
shopping habits of potential customers permeate any trademark
infringement analysis.
In the Second Circuit, the factors for determining likelihood of
confusion include the strength of the mark, the degree of similarity
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the
likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual
confusion, the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its
own mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the
sophistication of the buyers.6 9 But it is often unclear which factors
should be weighed most heavily, and the factors themselves vary
from circuit to circuit." Professor Beebe's empirical study of the
multifactor test concludes that courts tend to decide cases based on
just five core factors, listed here in order of importance: (1) the
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
67. Meaghan E. Goodwin, Pricey Purchases And Classy Customers: Why
Sophisticated Consumers Do Not Need The Protection Of Trademark Laws, 12
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 261 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
68. Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1591 (2006) (providing a table showing
which circuits use the various factors; ten circuits consider customer
sophistication).
69. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
70. See Beebe, supra note 68, at 1596 (providing a table demonstrating
which factors are weighed most heavily in different circuits).
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similarity of the marks, (2) the existence of defendant's bad intent,
(3) the proximity of the goods, (4) the strength of the plaintiffs
mark, and (5) evidence of actual confusion.7 1 This list can be
further narrowed to the first three factors, given that survey
evidence of actual confusion "is in practice of little importance,
and . . . the doctrine of trademark strength, particularly as it relates

to the concept of inherent distinctiveness, has broken down."72
Interestingly, the customer sophistication prong is absent from
the multifactor test in some circuits, and even in circuits that do
include this factor, it is sometimes ignored." This is unfortunate,
because sophistication often affects case outcomes when explicitly
considered.74 Customer sophistication is the only factor that
compels the judge to explicitly analyze the "consumer" element of
the infringement analysis. This would seem to be a crucial part of
the test, given that the standard for infringement is whether
consumers are likely to be confused.
The multifactor test often serves to obfuscate what is a primary
motivator behind a judge's decision, which is whether the judge
thinks that consumers are likely to be confused based on the
judge's own perception of the consuming public. Professor Ann
Bartow argues that, in practice, such a standard is overly lenient
towards trademark plaintiffs: "If the judges assume the average
shopper is rather guileless and simpleminded, then anything that is
even arguably mildly perplexing can be understood to meet this
low threshold."" Others agree: "The courts rarely evaluate the
consumer confusion inquiry in light of 'specific and persuasive
evidence about consumer behavior, relying instead on precedent
built 'on personal intuition and subjective, internalized
stereotypes.'" 7
71. Id. at 1623-42.
72. Id. at 1623.
73. Id. at 1643 (Beebe's empirical analysis shows that this factor is left out of
approximately sixteen percent of opinions from circuits that include a customer
sophistication prong).
74. Id. at 1642-43.
75. Bartow, supra note 43, at 747.
76. Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, Sophistication,
Bridging the Gap, and the Likelihood of Confusion: An Empirical and
Theoretical Analysis, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 913 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas R.
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A. JudicialPresumptions ConcerningConsumer Behavior Affect
Case Outcomes
Because the metric of trademark infringement is consumer
confusion, trademark law is reactive to consumer intelligence and
behavior. But it would be more accurate to say that trademark law
is reactive to how courts perceive consumer intelligence and
behavior. Trademark cases tend to fall into two categories: those
where consumers are said to be dumb and inattentive, and those
where consumers are viewed as intelligent and discerning."
Courts find the former to be easily confused, and the latter less
so. 78
Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J, C. Dowd & Co.," a case from
1910, is an oft-cited example of a court treating consumers as what
Beebe calls "the fool."" In Dowd, Judge Frankfurter wrote that
"the law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the
public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not
stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general
impressions."" This sentiment is echoed in Stork Restaurant,Inc.
v. Sahati, a Ninth Circuit case from 1948, which stated that one of
the purposes of trademark law is to "safeguard from deception ...
the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible."82
Other cases view the consumer as more of a mall-dwelling,
George A. Romero-style zombie. In Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago
Pickle Co., the court described the typical consumer as one who
wanders the aisles of supermarkets in a state "not unlike that of
hypnosis."8 Similarly, in a 1942 Supreme Court case, Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., the court
Lee et al., An Empiricaland TheoreticalAnalysis] (citing to Bartow, supra note
43, at 772).
77. Id. at 917.
78. Id.
79. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910).
80. Beebe, supra note 10, at 2023.
81. Dowd, 178 F. at 75.
82. Stork Rest., Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948).
83. Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171 F. Supp. 671, 676 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
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stated that a customer does not buy what he wants, so much as
"what he has been led to believe he wants."84
These cases were decided many decades ago, which perhaps
accounts for the extreme condescension and paternalism present in
the language. Although more recent cases tend to give consumers
a bit more credit," negative views of consumer sophistication still
permeate decisions and affect case outcomes." For example, in
Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., the court
stated that "with respect to consumers, the products at issue here,
while potentially high in quality, are low cost food and beverage
items 'not conducive to the exercise of careful selectivity by
purchasers.'""'
A finding that consumers are sophisticated also affects case
outcomes. In Versa Products Co.. v. Bifold Co., the great care
taken by purchasers of the product in question contributed to the
court finding against any likelihood of confusion." The court in
Perini Corp. v. Perini Construction, Inc. went so far as to say:
"Although no one factor is dispositive of the 'likelihood of
confusion' inquiry, the sophistication and expertise of the usual
purchasers can preclude any likelihood of confusion among them
stemming from the similarity of trade names."89
To summarize, the cases above show how judges have imagined
consumers in the past, and that these conceptions affect decisions.
Although many of the most egregious examples are from a number
of years ago, they are still useful in illustrating how central
assumptions about consumer behavior are to the trademark
infringement analysis.

84. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205 (1942).
85. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171,
1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussed in more detail below).
86. See Beebe, supra note 68, at 1643-44 (stating that negative or positive
views of consumer sophistication tend to affect case outcomes, in circuits where
consumer sophistication is considered).
87. Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 875 F. Supp. 966,
983 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
88. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 213 (3d Cir. 1995).
89. Perini Corp. v. Perini Const., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1990).
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B. Presumptionsabout ConsumerBehavior on the Web
Presumptions about consumer behavior can be especially
important in cyberspace infringement cases, because the everevolving Internet is new territory for both judges and consumers
alike. For an example of how assumptions about consumer
behavior on the Internet influence case outcomes, a useful
comparison is found in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Tabari.
In Brookfleld, the court found the defendant movie rental store's
use of the URL <moviebuff.com> to infringe the plaintiff software
manufacturer's MOVIEBUFF mark."o Central to the court's
analysis were a number of assumptions about consumer behavior
on the Internet. First, the court assumed that Internet users would
try to guess at a company's URL a number of times before
resorting to a search engine." This may have been accurate in the
mid-1990s when much of the public began using the Internet for
the first time. However, even then this behavior was undesirable:
it wasted time, ignored the existence of search engines, and was a
boon to Internet cybersquatters.
Second, an implicit assumption made by the Ninth Circuit was
that momentary initial interest confusion in the context of the
Internet could lead to appreciable search costs or frustration for the
consumer. 92 Surely, if websites were like brick-and-mortar stores,
where consumers had to drive from one to another, initial interest
confusion might indeed cause frustration. 93 On the Internet,
however, all one has to do is click the mouse to get back on track.
As Professor Petty points out, "[n]ot all situations involving
possible initial interest confusion involve coercive costs for
consumers seeking to resume their original brand search." 94

90. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at 1044-45.
92. Id. at 1062.
93. Niki R. Woods, Initial Interest Confusion in Metatag Cases: The Move
from Confusion to Diversion, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 393, 401-02 (2007).
94. Petty, supra note 45, at 766.
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A related assumption made by the Brookfield court is that
consumers are more likely to be confused by the ownership of a
website, as compared to the ownership of brick-and-mortar stores.
The court reasoned that consumers are less likely to take the time
to discern ownership on the Internet, where travelling from site to
site is as easy as pressing a button."
At one point in the opinion, the court recognized that the
likelihood of confusion depended on the sophistication of the
visitors to <moviebuff.com>.96 The court felt that this analysis
would be complicated in this case, because different classes of
consumers with varying degrees of sophistication were likely to
visit the site.97 Although the Brookfield court failed to endorse a
particular approach to the problem, it did note favorably that other
circuits have judged consumer sophistication based on the least
sophisticated class of consumer likely to buy the product or
services in question." This is not surprising, given the court's
assumptions about consumer behavior discussed above. Rather
than promote good shopping habits, the Brookfield court seems to
have had in mind the very least intelligent and attentive person
likely to visit <moviebuff.com> as it went through the multifactor
infringement analysis.
Ultimately, Brookfield imposed upon trademark law a
revitalized initial interest confusion doctrine. Given that the initial
interest confusion problems identified by the Brookfield court
solved themselves as consumers became better acquainted with the
Internet, the question becomes whether the decision was necessary
at all.
A more realistic approach was taken in Toyota Motor Sales,
9 There, the court held that the defendant's
U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari."
use of the
domain
names
<buy-a-lexus.com>
and
<buyorleaselexus.com> did not infringe upon the LEXUS mark

95. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057.
96. Id. at 1060.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277,
283 (3d Cir. 1991)).
99. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir.
2010).
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because of the defendant's nominative fair use defense.' 0 Courts
in the Ninth Circuit apply the test found in New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing,Inc. to assess likelihood of confusion
in the nominative fair use context."0 ' This test requires the court to
assess (1) whether the product was readily identifiable without use
of the mark, (2) whether the defendant used more of the mark than
necessary, and (3) whether the defendant falsely suggested he was
endorsed by the trademark holder.'02 Applying this test, Judge
Kozinski made a number of assumptions about consumer behavior
that were not supported by evidence. For example, Kozinski
stated, "[w]hen people go shopping online, they don't start out by
typing random URLs containing trademarked words, hoping to get
a lucky hit."' 03 Rather, Kozinski knew from his own experience
that online shoppers tend to use search engines to find particular
websites.'" Additionally, he assumed that "reasonable, prudent,
and experienced internet consumers are accustomed to . . .
exploration by trial and error," and would therefore not give up on
finding a manufacturer's website after one or two missteps.'05
Ultimately, these assumptions-that consumers are reasonably
sophisticated, and possess the patience for some increase in search
costs-helped lead the court to grant the defendant's appeal and
remand the case for further proceedings.' 06
Interestingly, echoes of the Brookfield decision can be seen in
In his
Judge Fernandez's concurring opinion in Toyota.
concurrence, Fernandez criticized Kozinski for making
assumptions about consumer behavior that were absent from the
factual record.o' Like in Brookfield, Fernandez was unwilling to
assume that Internet-bound consumers are unlikely to associate a
particular URL with a brand before actually going to the website

100. Id. at 1183.
101. Id. 1175-76 (citing New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc.,
971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1178.
104. Id.
105. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1179.
106. Id. at 1182-83.
107. Id. at 1185-86.
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and glancing over it.' 0" Although Kozinski's opinion took a
forward-looking, pro-competitive, aspirational approach to the
consumer, Fernandez's concurrence demonstrates that many
judges are more comfortable with the hands-on, paternalistic, and
conservative view towards the contemporary consumer, just like in
Brookfield.
C. The Shortcomings of the Customer SophisticationProng
On the surface, it might seem that wider adoption of (and greater
emphasis on) the customer sophistication prong of the multifactor
infringement test would solve many of the problems identified in
this paper. At the very least, this approach does have the benefit of
bringing the implicit, hidden biases of judges into the light of day.
But the problems with this solution are many. First, research
suggests that presumptions about the relationship between
consumer sophistication and consumer confusion are inaccurate.
Second, this prong tends to limit competition for many, if not most
products on the market. Finally, the consumer sophistication
prong fails to implement the central argument of this paper: that
trademark law ought to encourage all consumers to become more
sophisticated.
Positive factors relating to sophistication include the price of the
product, the complexity of the transaction, the infrequency of the
purchase, and the education, age, and income of the product's
typical purchaser.'09
However, these judicial assumptions
regarding sophistication can turn out to be inaccurate. One study
identified two primary antecedents for the exercise of consumer
care: the motivation to expend energy discerning one product from
another and the requisite mental ability to make this
determination." 0 A sophisticated consumer tends to have more
experience purchasing branded products; this experience becomes

108. Id.
109. Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks,
Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575,
602 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas R. Lee et al., ConsumerPsychology].
110. Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, supra
note 76, at 926.
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entrenched in the consumer's memory.'"
Consequently,
consumers more readily identify marks and logos as belonging to
the brand with which they are familiar. Given that sophisticated
consumers may have less motivation to shop carefully, this could
lead to a greater potential for confusion. This comports with
Professor Bartow's intuition "that individuals with few economic
resources pay careful attention to how they spend their scarce and
highly-valued dollars, while wealthy people are comparatively
more apt to spend small amounts of money somewhat carelessly or
recklessly."' 12
Moreover, this prong leads to decreased competition in markets
for lower priced goods. On one hand, the presumption that, say,
yacht purchasers are sophisticated will lead to less successful
infringement suits against yacht manufacturers. In fact, "[s]ome
courts have gone so far as to suggest that a high degree of
consumer sophistication in a target market may trump all other
factors, virtually eliminating the likelihood of consumer confusion
in the case of a professional or highly sophisticated buyer.""' This
presumption would allow new entrants in sophisticated markets
much more leeway in mimicking the trade dress of established
manufacturers, improving competitiveness by leeching a certain
amount of goodwill. On the other hand, manufacturers of cheap
products are subject to the standard likelihood of confusion
analysis. This creates an odd double standard, whereby consumers
deemed sophisticated benefit from increased competition for the
expensive products they purchase, yet consumers deemed
unsophisticated suffer from less choice and relatively higher
prices.
Furthermore, customer sophistication fails to take into account
many of the reasons why a consumer may or may not pay close
attention to his purchase. Consumers tend to pay close attention to
purchases they perceive as "risky," such as purchases of unfamiliar
brands or new technologies, regardless of their sophistication." 4

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 948.
Bartow, supra note 43, at 772.
Thomas R. Lee et al., ConsumerPsychology, supra note 109, at 581.
Id. at 649-50.
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At a personal level, consumers tend to pay attention to the brands
of things they care about."'
There appears to be advantages and disadvantages to placing
greater emphasis on the consumer sophistication prong. On one
hand, this would be a good way to force judges to explicitly
consider their own presumptions about the consuming public.
However, it would do little to benefit unsophisticated consumers in
terms of trademark overprotection and monopolization.
Trademark law should instead presume that all consumers possess
some basic level of reasonableness, sophistication, and
intelligence.

IV. TOWARDS

THE (IMAGINARY) PRUDENT CONSUMER

As we have seen, the multifactor likelihood of confusion test is
difficult to apply. Courts disagree which factors deserve the most
weight and whether certain factors ought to be included at all."'
The multifactor test pushes to the background what is often the
most important determination that a court makes: whether a
product's customer base is smart and attentive enough to notice the
difference between the plaintiff and defendant's respective marks.
Courts should instead place this element at the forefront of their
analysis as Judge Kozinski did in Toyota. Courts should follow
their own advice, and truly apply the standard of the "reasonably
prudent consumer" to the infringement analysis.
The "reasonably prudent consumer" would be more than just a
reflection of reality. Courts should feel free to lecture the
consuming public on their poor shopping habits and tell consumers

115. See generally Susan Fourier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing
Relationship Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343-53
(1998) (presenting research showing that consumers develop emotional bonds to
products related to their interests and perceived identities). That consumers care
about brands relating to things they care about is an interesting insight because it
suggests that a consumer is less likely to be harmed in those instances where she
truly cares about being harmed. Conversely, if it matters little to her which
particular brand she is buying, and she ends up being confused, is any real harm
done to the consumer, given that she could care less?
116. See supra PartIII.
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This approach would slow or even
how they ought to behave.'
scale back the scope of trademark protection and force courts to
keep up to speed with the ever-increasing sophistication of the
contemporary consumer.
A. The AspirationalConsumer
The aspirational consumer standard advocated here would have
a number of positive effects on the current trademark landscape.
First, it would impede the expansion of trademark rights through
the trademark feedback loop. Second, this presumption would
encourage consumers to exercise greater care when making
purchases, thereby favoring efficient, rational spending of money.
The aspirational consumer standard would halt or reverse the
recent trend of courts recognizing new forms of confusion. As
Professor McKenna argues, "not all confusion actually interferes
with the consumer's ability to make decisions in the
marketplace." 18
Regarding initial interest confusion, courts should presume that
consumers are willing and able to do some comparative shopping
when they visit the grocery store. The aspirational consumer is
smart enough to spot a specific brand he wants, but he is also
The aspirational
willing to consider cheaper alternatives.
consumer does not let minor inconveniences, such as visiting the
wrong website, cause her to throw her hands in the air and give up
the search.
As for post-sale confusion, courts worry that consumers will
mistakenly purchase a low quality knock-off, or that a flood of
counterfeits will reduce the value of the original by decreasing its
scarcity."' The aspirational consumer knows that there is a
117. For an example of a court lecturing consumers about poor shopping
habits, see Conopca, Inc. v. May Department Stores, Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 156364 (1994). There, the court stated that the testimony from an individual
consumer was insufficient to show actual confusion, because the consumer's
confusion was counterintuitive to the court. Id.
118. Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern TrademarkLaw's Theory of Harm,
95 IOWA L. REv. 63, 117 (2009).

119. See Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2000).
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widespread black market for counterfeit goods. For instance, she
would not assume that her friend's Prada purse is the genuine
article. Furthermore, the fact that there is a widespread black
market does not upset the aspirational consumer who has
purchased a real Prada purse. She knew what she was getting into.
The aspirational consumer model would encourage good
shopping habits. Research suggests that consumers expend more
cognitive effort while shopping when coaxed.'20 By freeing up the
market by allowing more mimicry by competitors, consumers will
be forced to think about their purchases. Throw in some initial
interest confusion and it is easy to see how a less stringent
infringement standard would encourage consumers to become
thorough, comparative shoppers. Consider the shopper who has
been using Old Spice for decades: he likely grabs his next stick of
Old Spice off the shelf with little thought at all. If the Acme brand
was packaged in such a way as to cause a hint of initial interest
confusion, then this shopper might take notice of the cheaper
Acme brand and consider whether the increased price for Old
Spice is worth it. In the end, he might still choose Old Spice, but
at least in the latter scenario his decision was an informed one.
Finally, if the aspirational consumer model were made into a
legal presumption, then parties could use this as a tool to help
This is
dismiss baseless litigation on summary judgment.
especially beneficial to new entrants in a market who might not
have the resources necessary to pursue litigation to trial.
B. Has the AspirationalConsumer Become Reality?
Consumers are becoming increasingly sophisticated. A large
part of this has to do with the availability of information on the
Internet. Professor Deborah R. Gerhardt argues that the Internet
has played a dual role of empowering consumers and loosening
dominant mark owners' hold on the marketplace. 2 ' In the online
shopping context, consumers can compare similar products side by
side, read reviews from experts or fellow consumers, and easily
120. Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, supra
note 76, at 926.
121. Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 456-57.
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locate the cheapest seller.122 Goodwill and reputation take a
backseat to accurate information about the actual product. For
example, if you have had good experiences with Old Spice
products, but its new shampoo is getting terrible user reviews,
which source of information is the contemporary consumer likely
to trust most?
Tellingly, research suggests consumers are less likely to make
repeat purchases of a particular brand on the Internet than they
would be in the context of brick-and-mortar shopping.123 When
robbed of the atmospherics associated with brick-and-mortar
shopping consumers are more willing to take a risk on something
new based on information garnered online. This is because
consumers are more likely to rely on emotion when making
purchases at a physical store, and emotion is intertwined with
brand preference consistency.' 24 Perhaps this phenomenon is
related to observations that the Internet has accelerated market
fragmentation, and that the resulting increase in variety of
consumption styles might free up the market and decrease the
dominance of famous brands.125
This online behavior may have spillover effects into the physical
realm of brick-and-mortar shopping. Before making a purchase
that a customer finds significant, either on account of the price of
the good in question or because the consumer truly cares about the
quality of the particular good, the consumer is liable to do at least
a few minutes of research on the Internet. With the advent of
smartphones and the ubiquity of Internet access, this research can
be completed in the checkout aisle. Now that many smartphones
come equipped with quick and easy-to-use barcode scanners, it
seems reasonable that shoppers may engage in some Internetbased, comparative shopping even for relatively minor purchases
122. Id. at 463-64.
123. See generally Leonard Lee et al., In Search ofHomo Economicus, supra
note 50, at 173-87 (arguing that consumers are more likely to make repeat
purchases when surrounded by brick-and-mortar store atmospherics, which tend
to have an emotional impact on consumers).
124. Id. at 185.
125. See generally Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A
DialecticalTheory of Consumer Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES.
70-90 (2002).
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like deodorant. It seems intuitive that consumers will become less
reliant on the information-conveying role of advertisements of
trademarks as they gain access to more accurate, easily available
information online.
It may be that trademark law has already begun reflecting the
increased sophistication of the contemporary consumer.
In
particular, the Toyota decision from the influential Ninth Circuit
shows that at least some judges are becoming skeptical of
infringement claims with little evidence of consumer harm. If this
is indeed the case, it is good news for consumers and the trend
should be encouraged.
C. Responses to PotentialCriticism
One criticism of this approach is that the aspirational consumer
model will lead to more confusion and higher search costs.
Concededly, the initial shift to an aspirational consumer standard
may result in a spike in confusion in the short term. Luckily, as
demonstrated in the study conducted by Professor Thomas R. Lee,
consumers adapt.'26 Consumers will exert cognitive effort in
identifying brands when motivated.'2 7 Thus, with a little prodding
and a little confusion, courts can push consumers towards the
aspirational model. When consumers are coddled, on the other
hand, they have less motivation to think about their purchases, and
the presumption that consumers are "morons in a hurry" becomes
self-fulfilling.
As for higher search costs, this is a necessary tradeoff for
adoption of the aspirational consumer model. However, higher
search costs help promote competition by forcing consumers to
spend slightly more time finding the product they were originally
looking for. A reasonable balance must be struck between these
two interests. As discussed above, many commentators feel that

126. Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, supra
note 76, at 927 ("With past experience, knowledge structures develop in
memory that lay the foundation for expertise . . . [and] [t]hese extended

knowledge structures are then available to the consumer when exerting
cognitive effort as part of mental processes.").
127. Id. at 926.
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trademark law has traditionally placed too much emphasis on
protection, without due consideration given to competition. What
the aspirational consumer model hopes to do is help courts shift
the balance towards competition. In cases where significant search
costs are likely, even the aspirational consumer would be
confused.
Another potential criticism of the aspirational consumer
approach is that it requires judges to make judgments about
consumer behavior.'2 8 How accurate would these judgments be,
especially considering that the average age of federal judges is
slightly over 60?29 Critics might point to the evolution of caselaw
from Brookfield to Toyota as evidence that judges are slow to react
to changes in consumer behavior. After all, these cases were
decided a decade apart. However, this evolution occurred
precisely because Judge Kozinski wasn't afraid to tell consumers
how to behave. Without much in the way of factual support,
Kozinski acknowledged that consumers use search engines (and if
It turns out that Kozinski's
they don't, they should!).'"
assumptions were a good reflection of how consumers behave in
practice. It is important to keep in mind that judges make
assumptions about consumer behavior in any infringement case;
the aspirational model merely nudges these assumptions in a
particular direction and ensures that these assumptions are outlined
explicitly in opinions.
One might also argue that the aspirational consumer model is
unjust in that it would harm consumers who are truly
unsophisticated, particularly in the context of online shopping.
128. See Michael Rappeport & Sandra Kornstein-Cohen, When Consumer
Beliefs Are Based on a Court's "Intuition"-One More Issue Arising From
Conopco, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 218, 221 (1997) (arguing that consumer
confusion should be proved only by survey or testimony evidence from actual
consumers, and that such evidence should trump judicial intuition, even if the
consumers' mistake was based on faulty assumptions unrelated to the trademark
or trade dress in question).
129. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE 400 (2012).
130. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th
Cir. 2010).
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The poor, uneducated, or elderly may not have the same
opportunities as the rest of society to familiarize themselves with
the conventions of online shopping. Without strong trademark
protections in place, these individuals could become ripe targets
Even with the "aspirational
for scams and counterfeiters.
consumer" standard in place, however, trademark law can protect
against cases of sellers who purposively victimize unsophisticated
consumers. According to Beebe, bad intent is almost always
dispositive in favor of infringement.' 3 ' Although the aspirational
consumer model may result in greater confusion and search costs
for unsophisticated consumers in particular, there are existing
safeguards present in the law to keep things from getting out of
hand. Meanwhile, the gains had by unsophisticated consumers due
to increased competition and lower prices should help offset any
increase in search costs.
Due to the rapid evolution of the marketplace and advances in
technology, a "proactive" approach to the consumer may end up as
a mere reflection of reality, depending on whether a particular
judge is up to speed with the rest of society. In order to avoid
trademark law becoming weighed down by obsolete decisions, it
might be best to err on the side of being ahead of the curve, rather
than behind it.
V. CONCLUSION

The expansion of trademark rights over the past century is well
documented. Famous brands have used these rights to harass
smaller competitors with dubious litigation and to achieve
monopoly-like positions in the marketplace. The aspirational
consumer standard would be a simple means to scale back
trademark protection and promote healthy competition. Happily,
the Toyota case suggests that this approach has already caught on.
This trend will hopefully continue into the future, if just to keep
pace with a consuming public that is becoming ever more
informed, sophisticated, and empowered. Although this approach
is aspirational, it may simply reflect the reality of the modem
consumer, who has access to much more information than in years
131. Beebe, supra note 68, at 1629.
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past and is less reliant on the information-conveying purpose of
trademarks. At the very least, trademark law should neither
impede Internet innovation nor greater consumer participation in
the marketplace that such progress allows.
Andrew Martineau*
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